Closed For Business.

Unless it's open.

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So, we’re opening up this space to ideas about how to “fix” the crisis of the Strait of Hormuz. Unlike so many other “crises”, the “blockade” of the Strait really is a crisis. If it’s not resolved — if the Strait remains “closed” — the costs to billions of people around the world will be substantial. And it will get worse the longer the closure of the Strait goes on.

It could be that there’s no need to worry; that the combined U.S./Israeli aerial assault will lead to the collapse of the Iranian regime and the dissolution of the IRGC, which, for all intents and purposes, is the Iranian regime. That’s an outcome devoutly to be wished. If any military force on the planet can produce such an outcome, it’s the U.S. and Israeli militaries.

The chances of regime collapse occurring, unfortunately, are not good. One of the rules of warfare is: wars cannot be won from the air alone. Another is that asymmetric warfare combined with the horizontal escalation of same all but guarantees that, for the stronger power(s), victory is much harder to achieve. It takes more time and (much) deeper commitment, if it is to be achieved. Time is in short supply for the Trump administration. With each passing day, things for it get worse.

Regardless of how one views President Trump and/or the Trump administration, it is in nearly everyone’s interest that this crisis be resolved, quickly. The consequence of it not being favorably resolved is vast human suffering.

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First up is what we’ll call ‘The Haass Plan”, which Richard posted today on his excellent Substack newsletter site, Home & Away. Hardly a fan of President Trump or his national security team, he’s nevertheless offered him, and it, a “workable” plan that addresses the Strait “issue.”

Here’s the plan:

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This special and now updated edition of Home & Away is devoted to reopening the Strait of Hormuz. It includes a new proposal – one described here as “Open for All or Closed to All” – that I believe holds the best chance of resolving this issue satisfactorily.

First, though, let me explain how I got to this point. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz is the aspect of the war that most affects the rest of the world. The narrow international waterway, through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquified natural gas normally travels, is now under Iranian control. Little tanker traffic is moving, which more than anything else explains the sharp increase in the price of oil and gas resulting from the decrease in global supply.

Iran is only permitting vessels carrying its oil and gas to China, Turkey, Pakistan, and India to pass. Meanwhile, shipping from other regional producers bound for Europe and Asia has been shut down. If the status quo is allowed to stand, it will cripple the economies of Iran’s neighbors, trigger inflation and recession in many countries, and lead to massive food shortages worldwide stemming from a shortage of fertilizer.

The United States has put forward a vague plan for escorting shipping through the Strait and turned to its allies to join in. The answer, unsurprisingly, was a resounding “no,” reflecting as much as anything the lack of consultation that preceded this war and European unhappiness with other policies (above all tariffs and a lack of support for Ukraine) associated with the Trump administration’s poor treatment of America’s allies.

Allied reluctance to join in any effort to protect shipping in the Strait of Hormuz also reflects doubts about the mission itself. Protecting tankers and cargo vessels would put naval ships and their crews in harm’s way, making them vulnerable to Iranian drones, speedboats, mines, and missiles. It would require a large number of naval vessels and aircraft to escort the tankers. Even if successful, the undertaking would only enable a small amount of oil to reach the world. In short, a great deal of effort involving considerable risk and cost would yield little in the way of results.

Another option being discussed is the seizure of Kharg Island, the island at the northern end of the Persian Gulf used by Iran as its principal export terminal for its oil and liquified natural gas. Seizing and holding Kharg would be a difficult military operation that would require U.S. ground forces, something that would generate additional political controversy here at home (especially given the immense dissatisfaction with the war). Substantial casualties would be inevitable, and the mission would further erode U.S. missile stockpiles. The operation could well stimulate a pro-government response in Iran and would likely be seen by many there and around the world as a U.S. attempt to seize Iranian oil.

Still another option would be to include the goal of opening the Strait of Hormuz as part of a broader negotiation designed to end the war. The problem here is that this would take a good deal of time, as such a negotiation would invariably include other contentious issues, including a ceasefire, Iran’s nuclear program, Iranian missile and drone programs, and its support for proxies, not to mention Iran’s calls for reparations and sanctions relief as well as U.S. military withdrawal from the region.

In addition, conducting negotiations against the backdrop of the Strait’s closure would give Iran additional leverage to win as many concessions as possible. One could also add that any negotiation has become much more difficult due to Israel’s policy of targeted killings of high-ranking Iranian leaders. Delay works against U.S. interests, as the economic costs of the closure of the Strait will mount.

Let me address one other approach. In principle, the United States could end its involvement in the war and leave it to others to deal with the Strait. Trump has posted a statement to this effect. But declaring “mission accomplished” does not make it so. The United States would not be immune from the global economic consequences of higher energy prices, and leaving our friends and partners to deal with the consequences of a policy over which they had little or no say would undermine their confidence in U.S. reliability, quite possibly leading to more frequent conflict, expanded Chinese influence, and/or nuclear proliferation.

Against this backdrop, the time has come to consider an alternative approach to opening the Strait. The United States (ideally with the political and military support of allies in the region, Europe, and Asia, which would likely be forthcoming given the extent of their energy insecurity) should consider adopting a policy toward the Strait of Hormuz that could be summarized as “Open for All or Closed to All.”

Under such a policy, the United States and its partners would announce that no tanker from Iran would be permitted to reach its destination in another country until Iran backed off its threats to and attacks on commercial vessels transiting the Strait. In other words, Iran cannot pick and choose who gets the region’s oil and who does not.

Accomplishing this aim would require setting up an effective defensive line across the 200-mile-wide Gulf of Oman. Doing so would require ships, aircraft, and drones patrolling well outside the Strait. An aircraft carrier and access to local bases would also be required. Commercial vessels that refused to stop at the line would be disabled. Governments that have title to the vessels or are expecting a delivery would receive advance notice of the new policy.

The “Open for All or Closed to All” policy could rally the world as it reflects a commitment to keeping an international waterway open to nearly everyone’s benefit. It would not increase the damage and destruction of the war. To the contrary, it would be operationally far less demanding and dangerous to undertake than either the through-the-Strait tanker-protection option or Kharg Island occupation alternatives. Countries currently receiving energy from Iran – China, India, Pakistan, and Turkey – might well pressure Iran to desist from threatening the use of the Strait by others lest they be worse off. Iran would be further isolated if it refused. The policy would deny Iran its primary source of revenue, adding to domestic pressures to accept a ceasefire or face a larger challenge to the regime.

One risk of this approach is that it would increase oil prices further. That said, the increase should be modest as it would only remove the relatively small amounts of Iranian exports still reaching the global market. Iran could threaten to attack the energy installations of other countries, but then again it was already doing so even before Israel’s ill-advised attack on the South Pars gas field, one the Trump administration should have prevented. The U.S. policy aim moving forward should be that neither the Israeli attack nor the Iranian retaliation is repeated. It is also to be hoped that the U.S. warning to Iran, that its remaining energy infrastructure will be targeted by the U.S military if it attacks the energy infrastructure of others, will have the desired deterrent effect.

Implementing the “Open For All or Closed to All” policy has the potential to cause an incident between the United States, either because the Chinese government objects to the stoppage of an Iranian tanker heading to China or to the stoppage of a Chinese vessel. The risk here could be mitigated by prior consultations with the Chinese government. Such consultations also provide an opportunity to remind Chinese officials that their country stands to lose a lot more than a few shipments of oil or gas if the war continues to escalate and Iran’s energy-related facilities are further damaged – and to persuade them to use their good offices to help end the conflict. Such talks could be accompanied by offering China the option to purchase some oil or LNG produced in the United States to offset some of what might be interrupted.

As is always the case, a proposal of this sort comes without guarantees. Iran may hold out against the pressure. But “Open for All or Closed to All” is preferable to the alternatives, both in what it would cost and in its potential to accelerate an end to this war and the economic consequences associated with it. And if it comes up short, the existing alternatives would remain as options. For now, though, when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, it just may require closing it down to open it up. (Source: richardhaass.substack.com)

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In the next episode of ‘Alternate Shots’, Richard and I will discuss his plan and other ideas about how to resolve “the Strait issue.” Those interested can find ‘Alternate Shots’ on Apple, Amazon, Spotify and most of the other major podcast platforms. I’ll let you know when the new episode is available.